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RECENT CASE NOTES
Administrative Law - Primary Jurisdiction - Antitrust
Violations and FCC Determinations
Radio Corporation of America, seeking to acquire television stations
in five of the eight largest market areas in the United States, made an
agreement to exchange its tenth largest market-area station in Cleveland for the fourth largest market-area station in Philadelphia owned
by Westinghouse. This exchange required approval by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), Communications Act of 1934,
48 Stat. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C.A. § 310(b) (Cum.
Supp. 19 5 8), and the antitrust division of the Justice Department was
informed of the FCC proceedings but did not request a hearing. The
FCC approved the exchange, and no appeal from this determination
was taken by the Justice Department. Thereafter the federal government instituted suit contending that the exchange was in furtherance
of a conspiracy in restraint of trade and violative of the Sherman
Act. RCA contended that, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
prior consideration of the exchange by the FCC precluded a subsequent suit through operation of the principles of res judicata and
collateral estoppel. Held: In antitrust cases the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction is inapplicable where no pervasive regulatory scheme or
rate structure imbalance exists, and any determination in such a case
by an administrative agency cannot bar a subsequent antitrust action.
United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
Similar to the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies,
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction attempts to promote a properly
balanced relationship between courts and administrative agencies
charged with regulatory duties. United States v. Western Pac. R.R.,
352 U.S. 59 (1956). Primary jurisdiction determines only whether a
court or agency will initially decide a particular issue, 3 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 19.01 (1958), and application of the doctrine
means that an appeal to a court will lie to test only whether an agency
acted within its statutory bounds and on the basis of rational evidence
supporting a reasoned conclusion, Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandsten Co., 356 U.S. 481, 500 (1958) (dissenting opinion). Since the
first application of this doctrine by the Court in a determination of
the reasonableness of a rail rate, see Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907), the principle has been extended to
cases raising issues of fact which a court normally has neither the
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training nor experience to determine,
States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952). Resort
agencies when uniform regulation of
pert analysis of voluminous technical
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Far East Conference v. United
must be had to administrative
rates, rules or practices, or exevidence can be achieved only

by agency decision. Great No. Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259
U.S. 285 (1922). Thus, a contested trackage agreement between two
railroads must be considered first by the ICC, Thompson v. Texas
Mexican Ry., 328 U.S. 134 (1946); the reasonableness of cancelling
an airline flight must be originally determined by the Civil Aeronautics Board, Adler v. Chicago F1 So. Air Lines Inc., 41 F. Supp. 366
(E.D. Mo. 1941); and a dispute between unions concerning the scope
of their respective bargaining agreements with a railroad company
is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjust-

ment Board, Slocum v. Delaware, Lackawanna eg W. R.R., 339 U.S.
239 (1950).
Although regulatory agencies do not enforce the antitrust laws,
primary jurisdiction of an agency will be upheld when the basis of
an alleged antitrust violation is the reasonableness of a rate, rule, or
practice in a regulated industry. See Keogh v. Chicago d N.W. Ry.,
260 U.S. 156 (1922). The fact that the federal government may be
the plaintiff in the antitrust action is immaterial. Far East Conference
v. United States, supra. Once an agency has defined its interest in
terms of authority to deal with an alleged antitrust violation, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires that a court may not disregard
the agency's ruling on the basis that the agency will in the future
alter its position. Seatrain Lines v. Pennsylvania R.R., 207 F.2d 255
(3rd Cir. 1953). Moreover, agency approval of a merger or consolidation may exempt that agreement from attack under the antitrust
laws when the agreement is within the statutory scope of agency approval, see, e.g., Civil Aeronautics Act, 52 Stat. 1004 (1938), as
amended, 49 U.S.C.A. § 494 (1952); Shipping Act, 64 Stat. 1277
(1950), as amended, 46 U.S.C.A. § 814 (1952), on the theory that
the regulatory act supersedes the antitrust laws and the agency has
exclusive primary jurisdiction, United States Nay. Co. v. Cunard S.S.
Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932). However, it has been held that antitrust
exemptions will not be implied by the court, and in the absence of
express congressional exemptions the doctrine of primary jurisdiction

is inapplicable. See United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States,
325 U.S. 196 (1945).
The Court in the principal case expressly limits application of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction in the antitrust field to industries
with rate structures and pervasive regulatory schemes. 358 U.S. at
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350. The weakness in applying the Court's reasoning is in determining what type of regulatory scheme is "pervasive." Admittedly the
broadcasting industry is under a comprehensive regulatory system,
e.g., regulation of licenses and permits. See FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940). Accordingly, since, in the absence
of statutory provision, primary jurisdiction has been applied most
frequently in those industries with a rate structure, see 3 DAVIS, op.
cit. supra, § 19.06, the presence (or absence) of a rate structure would
seem to be the material factor in determining whether or not a regulatory scheme is "pervasive." On the other hand, the Court in the
principal case could have reasoned that since a merger by common
carriers is exempt from the antitrust laws when approved by the FCC,
Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1080 (1934), as amended, 47
U.S.C.A. § 221(a) (Cum. Supp. 1958); 57 Stat. 5 (1943), 47
U.S.C.A. § 222(e) (Cum. Supp. 1958), and since a statutory exemption from antitrust laws is not accorded to broadcasters, see Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1087, as amended, 47 U.S.C.A. §
313 (1952), the regulatory laws cannot supersede the antitrust laws
and primary jurisdiction is inapplicable, see United States Nay. Co. v.
Cunard S.S. Co., supra. However, the weakness in this reasoning lies
in previous statements of the Court that indicate the modern problem
is not one of strictly applying the antitrust laws, but rather a problem
of harmonizing antitrust policy with regulatory policy, McLean
Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944); see also FCC v.
Radio Corp. of America Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953),
thus seemingly requiring consideration by a court of an agency's specific regulatory policy, 3 DAVIS, op. cit. supra, § 19.05 (1958).
The position taken by the Supreme Court in the instant case will
limit application of the primary jurisdiction principle in antitrust
cases, and may preclude application of primary jurisdiction in other
industries without rate structure and pervasive regulatory schemes,
e.g., pipeline construction and operation in the natural gas industries
under the direction of the Federal Power Commission. However, if
the modern problem is one of harmonization of the antitrust policy
with the regulatory policy, then a distinction between regulated industries based on the presence (or absence) of rate structures would
not seem to be justified. Moreover, since a regulatory agency may consider both the fact issues raised by an antitrust question and the effect
of proposed transactions upon a particular industry without removing jurisdiction from the courts to enforce the antitrust laws, it would
seem highly desirable to expand the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
The governmental interest in enforcing the antitrust laws is pro-
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tected by the provision permitting a direct appeal from an administrative decision, and, in the absence of appeal, a defendant should be
able to rely on an agency decision without fear of liability from a
subsequent collateral attack. Further, if the agency acts first, needed
uniformity and consistency in regulation of business is more readily

achieved, and judicial review derives the benefit of agency expertise.
Thus, by applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to prevent
a subsequent collateral attack on the basis of antitrust violations, a

balance (not obtainable under the present holding) would be achieved
in the protection of possible conflicting interests.
Ed. G. Ruland

Constitutional Law

-

Double Jeopardy

-

Successive

State and Federal Prosecutions
Petitioners were convicted in a state court for conspiring to injure
the property of another in violation of the laws of Illinois. Subsequently, in a prosecution based upon the same transaction as the state
conviction, they were convicted in a federal court for violating a federal statute preventing conspiracy to destroy means of communication operated and controlled by the United States. Held on appeal to
the Supreme Court: The double jeopardy provision of the fifth
amendment is inapplicable to successive state and federal prosecutions
for different crimes arising from the same act. Abbate v. United
States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (6-3 decision). In a case decided by the
Supreme Court on the same day, petitioner had been acquitted in a
federal court of robbing a federally-insured savings and loan association in violation of a federal statute. He had subsequently been indicted in a state court for violation of an Illinois robbery statute upon
an indictment reciting facts substantially the same as those contained
in the prior federal indictment. Held: The due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment does not prohibit a state prosecution founded
on conduct which formed the basis for a prior federal action. Bartkus
v. People of Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (5-4 decision).
Although presenting technically different problems, the primary
issue involved in both cases is the same, viz., whether the federal
constitution prohibits successive prosecutions by federal and state
governments based on the same transaction. The Constitution provides
that no person shall be "subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life and limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. (Of course
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the doctrine of double jeopardy applies only to criminal cases, Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938), including misdemeanors as well as felonies, Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163,
173 (1874).) Although this constitutional provision is binding only
on the federal government, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937), five states recognize the principle of double jeopardy as part
of their common law and all others, including Texas, have similar
constitutional provisions. See, e.g., TEx. CONST. art. I, § 14; State v.
Brunn, 22 Wash. 2d 120, 154 P.2d 826, 828 (1945). It has been
stated that the reason for this prohibition is the injustice of two punishments for one offense, Ex parte Lange, supra at 168, but the prevailing view as to the theory of double jeopardy provisions is the
danger inherent in allowing the full power of the government to be
brought against the accused twice for the same offense, United States
v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896); State v. Fredlund, 200 Minn. 44,
273 N.W. 353, 357 (1937). Double jeopardy applies equally to former acquittal or former conviction, since it is the fact of the trial,
not the outcome, that is basic to the concept of double jeopardy.
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 126 (1904); State ex rel.
Alcala v. Grayson, 156 Fla. 435, 23 So. 2d 484 (1945).
Thus, the concept of double jeopardy creates two basic problems:
when is one deemed to have been placed "in jeopardy"? and when
are two offenses sufficiently similar to be, in reality, one offense? ROTTSCHAEFER, HANDBOOK OF AM. CONST. LAw 812 (1939). For purposes of determining when one has been placed in jeopardy, it is generally
sufficient that (1) the accused has been brought to trial after a valid
information or indictment has been returned, (2) the defendant has
pleaded and been arraigned before a court of competent jurisdiction,
and (3) a jury has been impaneled and sworn to hear the evidence.
McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F.2d 640, 642 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 299
U.S. 610 (1936). The test of similarity of offenses is predicated upon
the "identity" of the offenses with which one is charged, Blockburger
v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); e.g., where the offenses
are perfectly distinct in law, the defense of double jeopardy is unavailable, even though they arise out of the same transaction. Burton
v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 380 (1906). Crimes prohibited by
both federal and state laws have been treated as offenses against both
governments and may be prosecuted by both. Moore v. Illinois, 20
U.S. (14 How.) 13, 20 (1852).
Although the Supreme Court previously had recognized the possibility of double jeopardy arising from successive state and federal
prosecutions, Houston v. Moore, 4 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820), it was
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in Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410, 419, 434-35 (1847), that
the Court first observed that the fifth amendment did not prohibit
a federal prosecution based on the same conduct on which a prior
state prosecution had been predicated. This principle was strengthened by dicta in later decisions which followed the reasoning that
each citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a state or territory subject to punishment by each sovereign for disobedience to its
laws; hence, successive state and federal prosecutions cannot be considered double jeopardy as the accused has, by one act, committed
two offenses. See, e.g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 389 (1879);
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 550 (1875); Moore v.
Illinois, supra; United States v. Marigold, 18 U.S. (9 How.) 560,
569 (1850). The issue of double jeopardy as a result of successive
state and federal prosecutions was squarely presented to the Court
for the first time in United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
Lanza had been convicted in a federal court following a prior state
conviction based on the same conduct. A unanimous Court held that
an act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties may be punished by each, and double jeopardy arises only in a
prosecution under the authority of the federal government subsequent
to a trial for the same offense under federal authority. United States
v. Lanza, supra at 382.
The principal cases are the latest in a long line of decisions upholding this principle of dual sovereignty. E.g., Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91 (1945) ; Guyot v. State, 222 Ark. 275, 258 S.W.2d 569,
570 (1953). However, the Bartzus case presents to the Court, for the
first time, the problem of a federal prosecution followed by state action, and requires a construction of the fourteenth amendment with
respect to that problem. The due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment does not incorporate the Bill of Rights as such, Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53 (1947); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949), but rather prohibits only those
practices "repugnant to the conscience of mankind," Palko v. Connecticut, supra at 323. Concluding that successive state and federal
prosecutions for a single transaction is not a "repugnant" practice,
the Court in the Bartkus case employed the same reasoning applied
in the Lanza case. The majority in the Abbate case also reaffirmed
the ruling of the Lanza case, reasoning that the Lanza principle was
firmly established, but see Grant, Successive Prosecutions by State and
Nation, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1956), and that to hold otherwise
would greatly impair the effectiveness of federal and state law en-
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forcement. Justice Brennan, though apparently agreeing with the
basic legal reasoning of the majority, dissented in Bartkus on the theory that the facts show that federal authorities participated in the
state trial to such an extent that it actually constituted a second federal prosecution in violation of the fifth amendment. See Knapp v.
Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958); Feldman v. United States, 322
U.S. 487 (1944). The other dissenters (the same in both cases) took

the position that although the argument of the majority that dual
offenses arise from one transaction merely because of dual sovereignty
is perhaps theoretically sound and logical, it is too subtle to be meaningful as the accused is nevertheless forced to face trial twice for the
same conduct. Moreover, denial to state and federal governments of

the right of each to prosecute offenses arising out of the same transaction will not necessarily preclude successful law enforcement by
either government. Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 COLUM. L. REv. 1309, 1330 (1932). In accord with the

position of the dissenters, it has been suggested by legal writers that
the courts adopt the principle of non bis in idem-where a particular
offense in its entirety is subject to prosecution by two sovereigns, the
first sovereign which undertakes the prosecution of the offense "absorbs" the case, thereby precluding action by the other sovereign.
Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions,32 COLUM. L. REv.
1309, 1330 (1932). However, the majority in Bartkus suggests that

this problem is not one for the courts but one to be resolved by the
federal and state legislatures. It has also been pointed out by legal
writers that the constitutional division of power between local and
federal governments gives both state and federal governments ample
protection. See Grant, Successive Prosecutions by State and Nation,
4 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1, 37 (1956); Comment, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 83
(1955). Further, far-sighted cooperation between the local and national governments as mutually supplementing agencies of law enforcement would resolve much conflict. Pound, Cooperation in Enforcement of Law, 17 A.B.A.J. 9 (1931).

The entire judicial history of the problem reflects the dilemma of
the Court in trying to reconcile two important interests, viz., protection of the rights of the individual as guaranteed by the Constitution,
and protection of the concept of dual sovereignty inherent in our federal system of government. The idea of dual sovereignty as applicable
to the double jeopardy principle was announced at a time (Moore v.
Illinois, supra, decided in 1852) when federalism was of paramount
concern to the Court. The issue then before the Court was whether
both state and federal governments could make the same conduct a
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crime and double jeopardy was only a hypothetical issue. It is unfortunate that the Court in the Lanza case chose to treat this dicta as settled precedent. Similarly, in the instant cases, the Court has refused to

extend the scope of its reasoning beyond the evolution of the Lanza
principle. It may well be that a broader re-evaluation of this problem,
in the light of the increasing opportunities for successive prosecutions

based on a single transaction, would suggest some way of resolving the
dilemma which would not be so offensive to the spirit of the Constitution. The adoption of the principle non bis in idem, coupled with substantial cooperation between the law enforcement agencies, seems to
offer an excellent solution. Whether non bis in idem or some other
principle is utilized, a change appears desirable inasmuch as the sole
distinction between these state and federal offenses seems to be found
in the differing interests of the two sovereigns rather than in some aspect of petitioner's conduct. Regardless of the syllogistic perfection of
the Lanza principle, shorn of the subtleties of legal fiction, there clearly remains two prosecutions for one wrong.

Earldean V.S. Robbins

Constitutional Law -

Searches and Seizures - Right
To Enter Private Home Without a Warrant

D, by refusing to permit public health officials to enter his home,
violated a municipal health ordinance which gave those officers the
authority to enter and inspect a private dwelling without a warrant
provided they had probable cause to suspect a nuisance. Although
another city ordinance made failure to abate a nuisance a misdemeanor, D was fined only for his refusal to let the officers enter. Held: A
city health ordinance which gives public health officials the authority
to enter and inspect a private dwelling without a warrant when they
have probable cause to suspect a nuisance does not violate the fourth
or the fourteenth amendments of the federal constitution. Frank v.
Maryland, 360 U.S. 914 (1959) (5-4 decision).
The enactment and enforcement of health laws is a proper exercise
of a state's police power to protect the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the public, Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898),
and a state, acting through its legislature, may delegate this power to
its municipal subordinates, Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922). Although the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not
curtail the proper exercise of the state police power, Louisville & N. R.
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Co. v. Melton, 218 U.S. 36 (1910), an unreasonable or arbitrary ex-

ercise of this power is a violation of the fourteenth amendment, Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904). Moreover, as one of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights which is incorporated into the four-

teenth amendment, see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947),
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, secured
by the fourth amendment, is enforceable against the states by operation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
Cases construing the prohibition of the fourth amendment generally have been concerned with criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Miller v.
United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10 (1948); Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933);

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Accarino v. United
States, 179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949). In such cases it has generally
been held that a search warrant is required for a lawful search and
seizure, and the right to search without one is exceptional. United
States v. Di Corvo, 37 F.2d 124 (D.C. Conn. 1927). However, since
the fourth amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches and seizures and impliedly allows reasonable ones, it has been held that searches and seizures made incident to a lawful arrest are reasonable although
made without a warrant. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925). The first case to consider unreasonable searches and seizures in
connection with searches by public health officials held that absent an
acute emergency precluding resort to a court or magistrate, a public
health official could not enter a private home to inspect sanitation
conditions without a warrant. District of Columbia v. Little, 178
F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
Although the majority of the Supreme Court in that case did not pass
on the constitutional issue, the dissent argued that the search by the
health officer was reasonable, routine, accepted, and important to the
protection of the public health and welfare. District of Columbia v.
Little, 339 U.S. at 7-8.
The decision in the instant case was based largely on the theory
that the fourth amendment applies only to unreasonable searches and
seizures made in connection with criminal proceedings, and finds
strength in the argument that the fourth and fifth amendments are
to be read together, Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), implying that the
fourth, like the fifth, applies only to criminal matters. But see Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690 (D.C. Cir. 1940). The
district court in the Little case discredited this argument by empha-

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 13

sizing that the basic premise of the protection afforded by the fourth
amendment was not self-incrimination, but rather was the commonlaw right of privacy in one's home. District of Columbia v. Little,
supra at 16. See 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 610, 611
(8th ed. 1927). That court further stated that to support such an
argument would lead to the "fantastic absurdity" of a suspected criminal having protection against the search of his home and a man
not suspected of a crime having no protection. Districtof Columbia v.
Little, supra at 17. The decision in the instant case indicates a liberal
departure from the search and seizure requirements which heretofore
have been strictly guarded. See Perry v. United States, 14 F.2d 88
(9th Cir. 1926); Leonard v. United States, 6 F.2d 353 (1st Cir.
1925). Although the exercise of the police power by a state may indicate a growth and development of the law rather than a tyrannical
assertion of power, Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), and
although the obsolete methods of past generations must yield to the
modern conception of progressive sanitation and public welfare, Walcher v. First PresbyterianChurch, 76 Okla. 9, 184 Pac. 106 (1919),
it is significant to note the firm declaration of the Supreme Court that
"ethe search of a private dwelling without a warrant is in itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws," Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20 (1925). If there is no limit to the police power, then constitutional guarantees become mere directory suggestions without
force or life, and the citizen is afforded only an illusory protection
against the invasion of his rights. Goldman v. Crowther, 147 Md.
282, 128 Atl. 50 (1925). Accordingly, no general exploratory search
and seizure of either persons, houses, or effects can ever be justified,
either with or without a warrant. United States v. Rembert, 284 Fed.
996 (S.D. Tex. 1922). Such general explorations as the one in the
instant case have not been allowed incident to a lawful arrest, Agnello v. United States, supra, or even with a valid search warrant,
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931). But
see Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). The significance
of the decision in the instant case is that it opens the door for any
official, be he police officer or administrative official, to invade the
privacy of one's home with only his personal suspicion as his guide
and the police power as his authority. Thus, while adhering to the
somewhat weak theory that the fourth amendment applies only in
criminal proceedings, it would seem that the Court failed to see
the possible destructive consequences of its decision.
The thorough review which is currently being given the law of

RECENT CASE NOTES
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search and seizure must yield some concrete standards, but it seems
that the decision in the instant case is a move in the wrong direction.
The history of the fourth amendment does not seem to substantiate clearly the position of the majority that it has never been meant
to apply except in criminal cases. The distinction drawn between
criminal and civil proceedings is a distinction without difference
since in many situations the investigation for a civil violation may
well lay the foundation for a subsequent or collateral criminal prosecution. Moreover, it would seem that the Court in the instant case
has upset the delicate constitutional balance between the rights of
the individual and community health safeguards, since the process
of securing a search warrant involves only slight inconvenience to
the official. The Court could have better maintained this balance by
establishing some standard whereby in the absence of a vital emergency the public officer would be required to secure a search warrant,
whether investigating a crime or inspecting a home under a municipal health ordinance. Instead of the discretion of the officer being
the sole guide, the reasonableness of the search would be determined
by a court looking into the nature of the investigation, the end
sought, and the comparative needs and rights of the community
and the individual. This result would seem more consistent with the
mandates of the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
George Howard Nelson

Contracts -

Defense of Illegality of Antitrust Laws

Violation

P, engaged in the business of marketing onions, informed D that
he owned a substantial amount of onions which he would release upon
the futures exchange, with a resulting depression in the price of onions,
unless D and other growers purchased a large portion of these onions.
Fearful that such action would cause him a substantial loss, D agreed
to purchase some of P's onions at a reasonable price. After accepting
a portion of the onions for which he had contracted, D repudiated
the contract. P sold the balance of D's onions and brought suit for
the difference between the market and contract prices. D contended
that the entire transaction was in violation of the Sherman Act and
therefore he was not liable for the damage suffered by P as a result
of the repudiation. Held: Where a lawful sale for a fair consideration
constitutes a complete economic transaction in itself, a concomitant
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violation of the antitrust laws is not a defense to an action for breach

of the contract. Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959).
At common law, an illegal contract is unenforceable. Oscanyan v.
Winchester Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261 (1880); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 598 (1932). However, an exception to this common-law
doctrine is recognized if the plaintiff is innocent and justifiably un-

aware of the illegality, 5

WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §

1631 (rev. ed.

1937), or if some public policy is served by enforcement, 5 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra § 1632. Further, a severable agreement, a portion
of which is illegal, may be enforced as to the legal portion. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §
518, 606-07; 5 WILLISTON, Op. cit. supra
§§ 1661, 1664A. Although the Sherman Act is generally considered
to embody common-law principles as applied to trade and commerce,
5 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra § 1658A, its definition of an illegal contract is more comprehensive than that of the common law, Loewe v.
Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908); Lockhart, Violation of the Antitrust
Laws as a Defense in Civil Actions, 31 MINN. L. REV. 507, 514

(1947).
It is generally stated that the remedies provided by the Sherman
Act are exclusive, Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S.
590 (1921), and may not be expanded judicially by including avoidance of private contracts as a remedy, Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn
Products Co., 236 U.S. 165 (1915). Accordingly, since the Sherman

Act does not specifically allow avoidance of private contracts on the
ground of illegality, Lockhart, supra at 515, it has been held that a
collateral attack, alleging that the plaintiff is doing business in viola-

tion of the Sherman Act, will not be a defense to an action to enforce
a contract. Small Co. v. Lamborn & Co., 267 U.S. 248 (1925);

Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Products Co., supra; Cincinnati Packet Co.
v. Bay, 200 U.S. 179 (1906); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184
U.S. 540 (1902); The Charles E. Wisewall, 74 Fed. 802 (N.D.N.Y.
1896). Moreover, generally there is no true connection between the
contract in question and the combination that is violative of the
Sherman Act, and, thus, a collateral attack would not be sustained.

See Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., supra. However, if the contract in question constitutes an essential part of a Sherman Act violation, the defense has been permitted, Continental Wall Paper Co.
v. Voight &. Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227 (1909), on the theory that to
enforce the contract, the court would be directly aiding a violation
of the Sherman Act, see Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S.

70, 88 (1902); McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639 (1899). Cf.
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Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942);

B. B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942); Lockhart, supra at
539 (a Sherman Act violation permitted as a defense in patent infringement cases on the theory of public interest in freedom from
invalid patents and from restraints of trade).
The problem faced by the Court in the principal case was not
whether the remedies provided by the Sherman Act may be expanded
judicially by allowing avoidance of private contracts, but, rather,
what type of conduct is necessary before a violation of the Sherman
Act will be permitted as a defense. 358 U.S. at 521. The Court
reasoned that while restrictive agreements in direct violation of the
Sherman Act could not be enforced, the agreement to sell the onions
was a complete economic transaction in itself, and hence was severable
from the accompanying restrictive agreement. 358 U.S. at 521. This
reasoning is questionable when applied to the facts in the instant
case, since by the admission that this sale furnished the occasion
for, and was part of, the restrictive agreement, the Court is in fact
enforcing the major portion of a contract in restraint of trade. See

Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight d Sons Co., supra. However,
the contrary policy factor of unjust enrichment strengthens the
reasoning of the Court, since the absence of this factor has been
determinative in permitting Sherman Act illegality as a defense.

Cf. Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight & Sons Co., supra. Thus,
in an action on a contract where a Sherman Act violation is alleged
as a defense, if the consideration is fair, if some performance has
been rendered and value received, and if the illegal portions of the
contract are logically severable, the defense may not be permitted.
Conversely, factors of excessive price, executory agreements, or nonseverability may be determinative in permitting the defense and
not enforcing a contract. See Lockhart, supra at 573. (Of course, an
excessive price on the market had been created by the parties in the
instant case by withholding even a few of the products from the
market, but this did not influence the Court.) However, even the
determinative factors may not be sufficient to permit the defense,
e.g., had D in the principal case accepted all of the onions, withheld
them from the market as agreed, and not paid any of the purchase
price, enforcement of the contract would have been enforcement
of the precise conduct prohibited by the Sherman Act; yet, the degree of unjust enrichment to D would have been greater, and the
Court might have enforced the contract, notwithstanding its nonseverability. Refusing to enforce the contract but permitting recovery on a quantum reruit theory may be the solution to this
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problem. This solution would seem to conform more to the spirit
of the Sherman Act than the solution adopted in the instant case.
Even though the reasoning of the Court may be questioned, the
principal case is helpful in determining what factors are of sufficient
materiality to permit a Sherman Act violation as a defense to an action on a contract. The Wall Paper case sanctioned the defense, the
Wilder case limited the defense to direct attacks on the contract
in question, and the principal case further restricts the permissible
use of the defense in direct attacks to situations where enforcement
would itself be a restraint of trade. Unjust enrichment of a defendant is a justifiable concern, and it is doubtful that adoption of a
strict policy of non-enforcement of agreements tainted with Sherman Act illegality would decrease the number of such agreements.
However, the respective bargaining positions of the parties should
be observed, and a plaintiff who threatens economic reprisal unless
his terms are accepted, as did P in the principal case, should not have
the blanket aid of a court in enforcing his contract.
Richard N. Countiss

Labor Law-

Certification Proceeding-

Judicial Review

The National Labor Relations Board issued an order certifying an
employees' association as the representative of a collective bargaining
unit containing both professional and non-professional employees.
The association brought suit in the federal district court, alleging
that the NLRB had exceeded its statutory power in including the
professional employees, without their consent, in a unit with nonprofessional employees. Section 9 (b) (1) of the amended National
Labor Relations Act provides that an appropriate bargaining unit
may not include both professional and non-professional employees
unless a majority of the professional employees vote for inclusion
in a mixed unit. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley
Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(b)

(1956). The

NLRB moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction on grounds that
section 9(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29
U.S.C.A. § 160(f) (1956), permitted judicial review of the NLRB
certifications only in conjunction with an alleged unfair labor practice. Held: A federal district court, under its general powers, has
original jurisdiction of an action to prevent the deprivation of a
statutory right. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
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Denial by statutory implication of judicial review of administrative actions is not a violation of due process of law, where the administrative procedure prescribed by the statute affords to those
affected a reasonable opportunity to be heard and present evidence.
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). Generally, when a

statute is silent as to the review of administrative decisions, the
court attempts to determine congressional intent, General Comm.
of Adjustment of Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs for Missouri-Kan.Tex. R. R. v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 320 U.S. 323 (1943); Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943), and
in the absence of statutory guidance or legislative history, recent
cases have presumed a right of review, see Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S.
363 (1957); United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949); Stark v.
Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944). This presumption has been overcome in a few cases by a showing of special reasons for the denial of
review arising from peculiar subject matter or circumstances. See
Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953) (status of one lawfully
inducted into the Army); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948)
(presidential directive that a certain alien enemy be deported);
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (executive recognition
of a foreign nation). Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C.A. § 1009 (1956), seems to create
a presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative actions
where the statute does not clearly withhold review. Schwartz, The

Administrative Procedure Act in Operation, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1173,
1239 (1954); Comment, 33 TEXAS L. REv. 663 (1955). Moreover,
it has been held that courts may take jurisdiction of a controversy
when Congress has failed to provide a means (e.g., an administrative
board) for enforcement of its statutory commands. Virginia Ry. v.

System Federation, 300 U.S. 515 (1937); Texas d New Orleans
Ry. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
However, under the unexplicit (as to judicial review) Railway Labor
Act, a federal district court does not have jurisdiction to review a
union certification by the National Mediation Board, even though a
violation of a statutory right is claimed. Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., supra. Further, even where the court does have
the power to hear the appeal, if the question involves an administrative determination, agency discretion will not be disturbed unless the
complaining party meets the heavy burden of proving that the
agency action was plainly arbitrary. Lucas v. Kansas City Structural
Steel Co., 281 U.S. 264 (1930).
Section 10 (f) of the act, supra, authorizes a circuit court to review
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final orders of the NLRB where there is an alleged unfair labor practice. Under this statutory scheme, it is well settled that orders of the
NLRB certifying unions as collective bargaining representatives as well
as directions with respect to elections to be held as a preliminary step
to certification are not final orders based on unfair labor practices;
therefore, they are not a proper subject for review by a circuit court.
AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940); NLRB v. International Bhd.
of Electrical Workers, 308 U.S. 413 (1940). However, as the com-

plete record of the Board's proceedings in an unfair labor practice case
is to be received by the reviewing circuit court, Labor Management
Relations Act, 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(d)

(1952),

it has been held that a certification order may be reviewed if it is the
basis for the alleged unfair labor practice, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.
v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146 (1941). There are indications, moreover, that
Congress clearly intended that judicial review of certifications be denied except in connection with section 10 proceedings. Labor Management Relations Act, supra; see Madden v. Bhd. & Union of Transit
Employees, 147 F.2d 439 (4th Cir. 1945); 93 Cong. Rec. 6444
(1947); H. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 56-57 (1947);

H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43, 59-60, 94 (1947); 79
Cong. Rec. 7658 (1934) ; Hearings before Senate Committee on Education and Labor, et al, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 584-587 (1939); S. Rep.

No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1935); H.R. Rep. No. 1147, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 23 (1935) (hereinafter cited as Labor Management Relations Act legislative history); Note, 42 MINN. L. REv. 938
(1958). Nonetheless, the fact that a representation proceeding under
section 9 of the act is consolidated with an unfair labor practice proceeding under section 10, and both proceedings are decided at the

same time has been held not to make the Board's rulings in the representation proceeding reviewable where its orders in the unfair labor
practice proceeding were not predicated upon its ruling in the representation proceeding. NLRB v. Falk.Corp., 308 U.S. 453 (1940). Although the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility of review of
a certification proceeding outside of section 10 in an independent suit
brought in a federal district court under its general jurisdiction powers when there is a clear showing of an unlawful action under the statutory scheme and a resulting injury threatened or suffered, the

Court stated that the question of jurisdiction could not be considered
until these criteria were present. See Inland Empire Dist. Council v.
Millis, 325 U.S. 697 (1945); AFL v. NLRB, supra. When the criteria
of statutory violation coupled with resulting injury being threatened
or suffered have been present, lower federal courts have split on the
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question of district court jurisdiction to review a labor certification.
Compare Reilly v. Millis, 52 F. Supp. 172 (D.C. 1943), aff'd, 144
F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 879 (1945), and
AFL v. Madden, 33 F. Supp. 943 (D.C. 1940), with ZimmerThomson Corp. v. NLRB, 60 F. Supp. 84 (D.C. 1945), and Northrop Corp. v. Madden, 30 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.Cal. 1937).
The instant case is the first time the Supreme Court has passed directly on the question of general jurisdictional power to review a certification of a union by the NLRB. The Court reasoned that since
Congress had given a right to professional employees, it must have
been contemplated that the right could be enforced, especially when
the NLRB attempted to exercise a power (certification of a professional-non-professional employee bargaining unit without approval of
the professional employees) that had been withheld specifically by
statute. 358 U.S. at 188-90. This reasoning does not seem to follow
congressional intent that certification questions can only be reviewed
in connection with an unfair labor practice order. Labor Management
Relations Act legislative history, supra. Although the Court does not
follow its holding under the very similar Railway Labor Act, Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., supra, the decision is not in
conflict with preceding opinions under the Labor Management Relations Act, which have indicated the possibility of review, Inland Empire Dist. Council v. Millis, supra; AFL v. NLRB, supra. Further, the
principal case seems to follow the recent case of Harmon v. Brucker,
355 U.S. 579 (1958), which held that a federal district court may review the administrative proceedings of the Army Review Board where
an alleged statutory violation is presented.
The instant case is a new precedent in the field of labor law and
possibly in the field of administrative law. The instant case and the
recent case of Harmon v. Brucker seem to indicate new criteria for
permitting judicial review of administrative proceedings under statutes unexplicit as to review. The principal case discounts congressional intention as gathered from the legislative history and possibly even
intention in general when a statutory right is violated. As a practical
matter, it seems desirable not to restrict all district court review of
certifications, for many times section 10 review is unavailable to an
injured union because no unfair labor practice has been committed by
the employer. Further, prohibiting review could induce deliberate unfair labor practices for the sole purpose of obtaining review of certifications under section 10. This strategy definitely would produce
more work for the Board and the courts since the created unfair labor
practices would have to be considered as well as the certification ques-
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tions. The argument that ingenious counsel will be able to get into
court under an "unlawful action" in labor certification controversies
when only an administrative discretionary issue is actually involved
may be met by allowing courts to take jurisdiction only when a clear
violation of a statutory right and a question of law is presented. Allowance of review when a statutory right clearly has been violated
should not interfere with administrative objectives nor permit the
court to substitute its judgment for that of the Board in the considerable areas of discretionary right. A check upon administrative proceedings is desirable for the same reasons that an appellate court's
check upon a trial court is desirable.
Lawrence E. Steinberg

Procedure -

Appeal and Error
Filing Appeal Bond

-

Time For

After a lengthy trial in a Texas District Court which resulted in a
jury verdict for D, judgment non obstante veredicto was entered for
P. Nine days later, D filed notice of appeal. On the following day, P,
not satisfied with his judgment, filed a motion for new trial. However, after D failed to file an appeal bond within thirty days after
rendition of judgment, P requested leave to withdraw his motion for
new trial. Later in the same day, D filed an appeal bond. The trial
court subsequently granted P leave to withdraw the motion for new
trial. On appeal, P contended that since D had not filed an appeal
bond within thirty days after rendition of judgment, rule 356 required that the appeal be dismissed. Held: Under rule 356, a party
who initiates an appeal by filing notice of appeal must file an appeal
bond within thirty days after rendition of judgment and not thirty
days after disposition of the adverse party's pending motion for new
trial. Neuhoff Bros., Packers v. Acosta, -Tex.-, 327 S.W.2d 434
(1959).
Perfecting an appeal from the trial court is now governed by the
Rules of Civil Procedure, TEX. RuILEs Civ. PRO. ANN. rules 3 52-69a
(1955) (hereinafter cited as "Rules"). A party litigant who falls
within the proviso of rule 324 may appeal from the district court
by filing notice of appeal within ten days after final judgment, Rule
353, but in all other cases appealed from the district court, a motion
for new trial, filed within ten days of the final judgment is a prerequisite to appeal, Rule 324. In the latter situation, if the motion for
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new trial is overruled by an order of the judge, notice of appeal must
be filed within ten days of that action, Rule 353, although, if the motion for new trial is overruled automatically by operation of law (45
days after filing of the motion or amended motions) notice of appeal
is not necessary. Combined American Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 214 S.W.2d
145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948). Thus (except where a motion for new
trial is overruled by operation of law) notice of appeal is always necessary, although in certain cases the filing of a motion for new trial,
and its subsequent overruling, will postpone the time for filing notice
of appeal. Of course, if a motion for new trial is granted, no appeal
is allowed. See Brazoria City v. Upham, 308 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1957); Bush v. Bush, 265 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954)

error dism. Further, whenever a party appeals, he must file a cost
bond pursuant to rule 354, unless he comes within the province of
rule 355 (the "pauper's bond"). Rule 356 requires that the bond be
filed with the clerk within thirty days after the date of the "rendition
of judgment or order overruling motion for new trial." The interpretation of this rule poses the controlling question in the principal
case: "In determining the time for filing an appeal bond under the
rule [ 356 ], may one litigant rely upon his opponent's action in filing
a motion for new trial?" 327 S.W.2d at 434.
In support of the instant court's holding is rule 5 which provides
that time limits under the rules relating to appeal periods must not
be extended except as provided in the specific rule. Accordingly, it has
been held that the time for filing the appeal bond is mandatory and
jurisdictional and may not be enlarged by the courts for any reason,
Glidden Co. v. Aetna Cas. &qSurety Co., 155 Tex. 591, 291 S.W.2d
315 (1956); Dallas Storage & Warehouse Co. v. Taylor, 124 Tex.
315, 77 S.W.2d 1031 (1934), nor waived by the adverse party, Grant
v. Hughes, 198 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946). It is well settled,

however, that the general rules governing appeals are to be construed
liberally, Hunt v. Wichita County Water Imp. Dist. No. 2, 147 Tex.
47, 211 S.W.2d 743 (1948); Bantuelle v. Bantuelle, 195 S.W.2d 686

(Tex. Civ. App. 1946), and in favor of the appealing party, Turnbow Petroleum Corp. v. Fulton, 145 Tex. 56, 194 S.W.2d 256
(1946); Lawyer's Lloyds v. Webb, 137 Tex. 107, 152 S.W.2d 1096

(1941 ). In the light of this principle and since rule 356 is phrased in
the conjunctive without reference to either party, a reasonable construction could lead to the conclusion that either party may safely
rely on the other's motion for new trial. See Meda v. Lawton, 214 Cal.
588, 7 P.2d 180 (1932). Accordingly, D in the instant case contended that the pendency of any motion for new trial operates to "ex-
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tend" the time for filing an appeal bond, on the theory that until the
motion is disposed of, it is uncertain that an appeal will be necessary.
327 S.W.2d at 435. The court rejected this argument and held
that the instant case was controlled by Peurifoy v. Wiebusch,
125 Tex 207, 82 S.W.2d 624 (1935). In that case the appellant
had filed a premature motion for new trial, which under the
law at that time was void. Rule 306c. (Rule 306c has since been
changed and now makes a premature motion sufficient.) In the
Peurifoy case, the court said that since appellant had in effect
not filed a motion for new trial (i.e., his attempted motion for
new trial was void), his time for filing an appeal bond "ran" from the
date of judgment. However, although in the Peurifoy case the other
party had filed a motion for new trial, that court did not consider the
possibility of a longer appeal time on the basis of the filing of a motion for new trial by another party after rendition of judgment; and
it is not discernible from the Peurifoy opinion that the court was even
aware of the problem presented in the instant case. Peurifoy v. Wiebusch, supra at 626.
Moreover, it seems that the construction rejected by the court in
the principal case would not actually "extend" the appeal time but
would merely place one who did not file a motion for new trial under
that part of rule 356 which permits filing within thirty days after
a motion for new trial has been overruled. On the other hand, since
appellee's motion for new trial was not in fact overruled but "withdrawn," adoption of appellant's construction would have necessitated
the interpretation that "dismissed by consent" means "overruling."
Thus, on this basis, the seemingly strict construction by the court
could be argued to be the more reasonable solution to the dilemma
presented by the principal case. See Glasscock v. Bryant, 185 S.W.2d
595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error ref. w.o.m.
A possible solution to the quandary presented in the principal case
lies in the discretion of the trial judge to refuse permission to withdraw a motion for new trial; such an interpretation would alleviate
the necessity for an interpretation that withdrawal means overruling.
However, even if the trial judge pursued this action and then overruled the motion for new trial, the instant court's interpretation of
rule 356 would still require a result tantamount to that in the principal case. For example, if P's motion for new trial had been overruled
(either by judicial action or inaction) D's appeal would still have
been dismissed since the court reasoned that one may file an appeal
bond within thirty days after overruling a motion for new trial only
if he himself has filed the motion. Moreover, in analogous rules (rules
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381, 384, and 386) establishing filing time predicated upon one or
more alternatives, it would seem that one can avail himself only of
those time limits under the alternative which he has performed, if the
view of the principal case is to be confirmed. Thus, even though the
construction of rule 356 by the court in the principal case may have
been the more reasonable solution to the problem presented by these
facts, the effect of the decision upon analogous rules would justify
amending the rules to clarify whether one party may avail himself
of time limits prescribed generally when supplementary motions have
been filed by another party to the suit.
Joe E. Griffith

Securities Regulation - Insider Trading - Invalidation
of SEC Rule on Stock Options
D, a director of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, sold stock of
the corporation, and within six months thereafter purchased similar
stock under a restricted stock option plan, realizing a profit on the
transactions. P, a stockholder of the corporation, brought an action
under section 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, alleging
that the profit should inure to the corporation. D contended that the
option plan under which he purchased the stock complied with the requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule X- 16B3, and was therefore exempt from the operation and effect of the Securities Exchange Act. Held, inter alia: A stock option is within the
purview of section 16 (b), and the SEC lacks quasi-legislative discretion to exempt a class of transactions from an enunciated congressional standard. Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y.
1959) (on appeal).
One problem Congress faced in enacting the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78jj (1952),was
how to prevent the abuse by corporate insiders of information available only to them because of their positions of trust in the corpora-

tion. Cole, Insiders' Liabilities Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,12 Sw. L.J. 147 (1958); S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
2-3 (1934). As one solution to this problem, Congress incorporated
section 16 (b) into the act, which provides that any profit realized by
a director, officer, or ten per cent shareholder from the purchase and
sale or sale and purchase within a six month period of the corporation's
stock will inure to the corporation. (Such a profit is characterized as
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a "short-swing profit".) 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p
(1952). In order to avoid the difficulties of such common-law ele-

ments as bad 'faith, the section operates in complete disregard of the
actual or intended use of the information by the insider. Gratz v.
Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951);
Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal.
1953); Cook and Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARV. L. REv. 385 (1953) ; Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6557
(1934). Section 16 (b) has been held constitutional, Gratz v. Claughton, supra, and has been construed broadly to "squeeze" all possible
profits out of stock transactions, Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d
231 (2d Cir. 1943). Moreover, courts have given the word "purchase," as used in this section, a broad meaning, bringing within the
definition a receipt of securities pursuant to an employment contract,
Truncale v. Blumberg, 88 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 182 F.2d
1021 (2d Cir. 1950), an acquisition of securities in connection with
a plan for corporate simplification, Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp.
361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), and an exercise of an option to convert preferred into common stock, Parke & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d
984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947). However, cases
construing the word "purchase" are to be decided on their own facts,
Ferraiolov. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), and transactions
which do not involve the economic equivalent of a purchase, and
where there is no possibility of abuse of information, have been held
to be outside the scope of the act on the theory that the particular
transaction was not a purchase, Shaw v. Dreyfus, 79 F. Supp. 533
(S.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337
U.S. 907 (1949) (acquisition of a pro rata right to subscribe to additional common stock) ; Roberts v. Eaton, 119 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y.
1953), aff'd, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1954) (statutory reclassification
of outstanding corporate stock).
Although section 16(b) is phrased in terms of absolute liability,
its purpose is stated to be the prevention of "unfair abuse of information" by corporate insiders, and the SEC is granted authority to exempt transactions "not comprehended within the purpose" of the
section. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p (1952). Pursuant to
this exemptive power, Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co. v. O'Neill, 168 F. Supp.
804 (E.D. Mo. 1958); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5312, May 21,
1956, and for the purpose of providing corporate insiders with beneficial tax treatment afforded them by Congress and facilitating the
stock option device as an incentive compensation plan, Greene v.
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Dietz, 143 F. Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 247 F.2d 689 (2d
Cir. 1957); SEC Securities Act Release No. 4754, Sept. 24, 1952, the
SEC promulgated rule X-16B-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(d) (1949).
The rule operates, in effect, to exempt from section 16 (b) all acquisitions of stock and non-transferable options pursuant to compensation
plans, provided the plans comply with certain restrictions (e.g., stockholder approval and limitation of shares subject to a plan), placed in
the rule as safeguards against abuse. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
591 (1951). The validity of rule X-16B-3 was upheld by the district
court in Greene v. Dietz, 143 F. Supp. at 473, but, the Second Circuit,
although affirming the decision on other grounds, expressed doubts
that the SEC had the authority to promulgate this rule. Moreover, the
Second Circuit warned that, pending re-evaluation of the rule, further
reliance on it would be "ill-advised," Greene v. Dietz, 247 F.2d at 697.
However, these expressions of doubt have been regarded as dicta in
subsequent cases concerning the rule. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co. v.
O'Neill, supra; Gruber v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 158 F. Supp. 593
(N.D. Ohio 1957). The principal case, although regarding this doubt
as dictum, stated that it was entitled to "this court's respect." 172 F.
Supp. at 253.
The court in the principal case described the function of the SEC
as that of making a "factual determination" concerning a particular
transaction, and exempting each transaction which does not fall within the provisions of the section. 172 F. Supp. at 255. Accordingly, the
court reasoned that the SEC has no power to exempt a certain class
of transactions, viz., stock option plans, from section 16 (b) liability.
This reasoning conforms with the general view that stock options are
among the transactions intended by Congress to be within the purpose of section 16 (b). Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. Walet, 104 F.
Supp. 20 (E.D. La. 1952); Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, supra at 55-58. However, certain stock option plans, providing the corporation with a less expensive means of promoting management incentive than by salary increase, have been recognized as essential forms of incentive compensation, Dean, Employee Stock Options, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1403 (1953), and have been accorded preferential tax treatment in that no realization of income occurs in
either the grant or the exercise of a stock option pursuant to a qualified (restricted) stock option plan, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 421.
Moreover, many bonus payment plans exempted by rule X-16B-3
provide for an annual granting of securities, and since any sale for
profit by the recipient would automatically fall within six months of
a prior or subsequent purchase, the decision in the principal case would
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render this type of transaction subject to section 16(b) liability,
thereby greatly diminishing the value of these plans. Cook and Feldman, supra at 635, 636; Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION, op. cit. supra
at p. 591. The controversy on appeal, therefore, will center around
the scope of discretion granted the SEC by section 16(b), i.e., did
Congress intend to give the SEC authority to weigh the possibility of
abuse of confidential information against interference by the statute
with a device beneficial to the corporation and its stockholders as well
as insiders, or (as held in the principal case) did Congress intend to
make section 16 (b) purely objective in its operation, with the SEC
acting merely as a fact-finding body. See Memorandum of SEC as
amicus curiae, Greene v. Dietz, supra, reprinted in CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP.
90,821 at p. 92,575.
Although the broad scope of the present rule X-16B-3 may have
justified its invalidation, it is inconsistent to say that the act is purely
objective in operation, and also that the SEC has the power to exempt
transactions not within its purpose. Congress must have intended that
the SEC be given the power to weigh the possibility of abuse against
interference with such a beneficial device, and to promulgate a rule
which will exempt an incentive compensation plan from the rigors of
section 16(b). If the SEC provided sufficient safeguards in its exemption it would seem that the value of stock option plans would far
outweigh the possibility of abuse, even though it is difficult to conceive a situation in which all possibility of abuse could be eliminated
by the SEC. For example, the SEC could incorporate into its exemption a required waiting period between the grant and exercise of the
option, thus bringing the transaction more within the policy of the
section. However, if the SEC is in fact restricted, as held in the principal case, it would seem that the decision has tacitly rendered invalid
every class of exemptions granted by the SEC pursuant to its statutory exemptive power.
Larry M. Lesh

Wills

-

Quantum of Estates Created

-

Rule

Against Repugnancy
T executed a will in which he apparently devised and bequeathed
all his property in fee simple to his wife in one paragraph, but in the
next paragraph directed that whatever property was not disposed of
by his wife during her lifetime should be divided equally between
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his and her heirs. A few years after T's death his widow died intestate,
still in possession of certain real and personal property willed to her
by her husband. A controversy as to the construction of the husband's will subsequently arose between the heirs: did the husband's
will give absolute title in the property to the wife or only a life estate
with a power of disposition over the remainder? Held: Where one
clause of a will purports to grant an estate in fee simple and the following clause attempts to limit this devise, the latter clause is void
for repugnancy to the former. Collie v. Tucker, -Ark.__,
317
S.W.2d 137 (1958).

The primary objective of any court in the construction of a will
is to ascertain the intent of the testator, In re Dimmitt's Estate, 141
Neb. 713, 3 N.W.2d 752 (1942), and rules of construction are designed to aid the court in determining this intention, Blaisdell v. Coe,
83 N.H. 167, 139 Atl. 758 (1927). Intention is to be gathered from
the whole instrument, Pearsonv. Orcutt, 106 Kan. 610, 189 Pac. 160
(1920); Hanks v. McDanell, 307 Ky. 243, 210 S.W.2d 784 (1948),
and it is presumed that every word or clause is intended to have some
meaning, Regnier v. Regnier, 122 Kan. 59, 251 Pac. 392 (1926).
Accordingly, no word or clause is to be rejected to which a reasonable
effect can be given. Strauss v. Strauss, 363 Ill. 442, 2 N.E.2d 699
(1936). A court will attempt to harmonize apparent repugnancies,
Regnier v. Regnier, supra; Crozier v. Bray, 120 N.Y. 366, 24 N.E.
712 (1890), and if two constructions are possible, one which will defeat the will, the other which will give effect to the will, the latter
will be adopted, In re Austin's Estate, 236 Iowa 945, 20 N.W.2d
445 (1945). Thus, by the better view, there is no necessary repugnancy where a later provision enlarges, Porter v. Union Trust Co. of
Indianapolis, 182 Ind. 637, 108 N.E. 117 (1915), or diminishes a
former gift, In re Keefer's Estate, 353 Pa. 281, 45 A.2d 31 (1946);

see Smith v. Bell, 6 Pet. (U.S.) 68 (1832). However, the intention
of the testator will not prevail over a clearly defined rule of law or
public policy. Hanks v. McDanell, supra.

If the language of a will expressly denominates the grants as a life
estate with a power of disposition and a remainder, most courts agree
that this express language will be followed. Darden v. Boyette, 247
N.C. 26, 100 S.E.2d 359 (1957); Edds v. Mitchell, 143 Tex. 307,

184 S.W.2d 823 (1945). Contra, Totten v. Dawson, 104 W. Va. 274,
139 S.E. 858 (1927). However, in construing a will wherein the
testator attempts by one clause to limit in some manner a grant in fee
simple made in a previous clause there are three conflicting interpretations. One interpretation is to apply the rule against repugnancy
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that a grant in fee once made cannot be limited or defeated by a subsequent grant to another person, and the attempted gift over is ineffective. Bernstein v. Bramble, 81 Ark. 480, 99 S.W. 682 (1907).
The theory of this interpretation seems to rest upon the generally
valid presumption that a grant which does not specify the quantum
of the estate created is nevertheless intended to convey a fee simple.
Fox v. Snow, 6 N.J. 12, 76 A.2d 877, 878 (1950) (dissent). To accept this reasoning the court usually must construe the parts of the
will separately, Minges v. Mathewson, 66 App. Div. 379, 72 N.Y.S.
612 (1901), and the result obtained generally contravenes the intention of the testator, Southworth v. Sullivan, 162 Va. 325, 173 S.E.
524 (1934). The least common interpretation is to acknowledge that
the testator intended to grant the first beneficiary a fee, but that the
fee is subject to being shifted upon the occurrence of a given event,
i.e., the death of the first beneficiary before disposal of the property.
See McClure v. Bailey, 209 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error
ref. n.r.e. Still another interpretation is to construe the general language of the will as granting a life estate with a power of disposition
in the first beneficiary and a remainder to the second beneficiary contingent upon there being property of the testator in the possession of
the first beneficiary at his death. See Hanks v. McDanell, supra. This
interpretation appears to be the modern rule. Glidewell v. Glidewell,
360 Mo. 713, 230 S.W.2d 752 (1950).
The principal case adopted the rule against repugnancy and thus
held the attempted limitation of the granted fee invalid. 317 S.'W.2d
at 139-40. A determination that the first grant was a fee simple
rested upon the rebuttable presumption that a grant which does not
state the nature of the estate is to be in fee simple, see Bernstein v.
Bramble, supra, yet the attempted limitation over was not accepted
either as directly limiting the first estate or as rebutting this presumption even though the court professed to construe the will as
a whole. Since it was admitted that the testator had two intentions,
these intentions could have been reconciled by viewing the second paragraph as an express limitation of the first estate or as evidence rebutting the presumption of a grant in fee simple. See Smith v. Bell, supra.
However, it seems that too little weight was given to evidence which
was clearly in conflict with a result reached merely on the basis of
a presumption. The court's unwillingness to set aside a "rule of
property," 317 S.W.2d at 140, is in accord with the theory that a
will is to be read as strictly as a deed and that subsequent provisions
could not limit estates previously granted. See Fox v. Snow, supra
(dissent). The court did state that a will granting a life estate with
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power of disposition would be given effect as such and that the testator could then grant the remainder to another. 317 S.W.2d at 139.
However, an examination of the cases cited for this proposition
indicates that the distinction between construing the primary clause
as a fee simple or as a life estate is based on minute variations in
the language of the first grant without consideration of the language
of the second. See Piles v. Cline, 195 Ark. 857, 125 S.W.2d 129
(1939);

Jackson v. Robinson, 197 Ark. 431, 112 S.W.2d 417

(1938); Bernstein v. Bramble, supra. To interpret a primary clause
in this manner is to ignore the double task of determining the intent of the testator and then giving effect to this intention so far
as possible.
Although it is well known that different persons can reasonably
construe language quite differently, the court in the instant case by
enforcing a narrow rule of construction rather than examining the
entire will for its actual meaning, clearly did not reach the result
intended by the testator. The court should have reconciled all the
provisions of the will, thereby giving effect to both the intention
that the wife have complete control of the property and the intention that any property left at her death be divided between his
and her heirs. The case is an unfortunate example of a court refusing
to take a forward step in line with modern authorities from other
jurisdictions.
Elwood B. Hain, Jr.

